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The lack of growth in the Brazilian sugarcane-ethanol complex since the 2008 financial crisis has been blamed on policies: lower mandate, holding gasoline prices below world levels, high fuel taxes, and inadequate fuel tax exemptions for ethanol. This paper develops an empirical model of the Brazilian fuel-ethanol-sugar complex to analyze the impacts of these policies. Unlike biofuel mandates and tax exemptions elsewhere, Brazil's fuelethanol-sugar markets and fuel policies are unique such that each policy, in theory, has an ambiguous impact on the market price of ethanol and hence on sugarcane This paper is a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org. and sugar prices. The results indicate two policies that seemingly help the ethanol industry do otherwise in reality: low gasoline taxes and high anhydrous tax exemptions lower ethanol prices. But higher mandates, hydrous ethanol tax exemptions, and gasoline prices had the expected impact of increasing ethanol and sugar prices. Eliminating Brazilian ethanol tax exemptions and mandates reduces ethanol prices by 21 percent. Observed changes in prices are explained by outward shifts in fuel transportation and sugar export demand curves, and bad weather reducing sugarcane supply.
Introduction
Brazil is the biggest sugar producer in the world (25 percent of the world total), the biggest sugar exporter (60 percent of the world total) and until overtaken by the United States recently, the world's biggest ethanol producer and exporter. Hence, the world prices of sugar and ethanol are expected to be directly linked and not diverge significantly, given the economics of sugarcane processing in Brazil. Figure 1 provides evidence that this may be the case. Brazil is regarded as the lowest cost producer of ethanol in the world but since mid-2009 to mid-2012, Brazil's market price of ethanol was higher than the U.S. price and Brazil became a major importer of U.S. ethanol. 1 The reasons for high ethanol prices in Brazil in this time period are manifold, including strong domestic demand for transportation fuels, increasing demand for sugar with world record sugar prices, and bad weather affecting the sugarcane harvests in the 2010/11 and 2011/12 harvest seasons. The impact of Brazilian government ethanol policies is also blamed for inadequate domestic supplies of ethanol due to lack of investment since the 2008 financial crisis (Jank, 2012) , an issue we will pay close attention to in this paper.
Brazil has developed a unique system of producing competing tradable products -sugar and ethanol -from non-traded sugarcane. Modern "flex-plants" can produce either sugar or ethanol from sugarcane, and within a production year, can switch between the two products up to about 65 percent of a product. 2 Furthermore, flex-plants can extract up to 18.6 liters of ethanol per tonne of sugarcane processed into sugar from molasses, a by-product of sugar production (Gopal and Kammen, 2009) . 3 The total output of sugarcane is shown in Figure 2 where ethanol's share has ranged between 45 and 57 percent of the total in the past 7 years. 4 This leads to two different demand curves for ethanol as transportation fuel: an anhydrous ethanol-gasoline fuel mixture (which we define as "fuel" in this paper) that all cars can use, and E-100 (100 The share of anhydrous ethanol in total ethanol consumption has increased from 33 percent in 2009/10 to 45 percent in 2011/12. 6 The reason for this development is not just an increase in the relative price of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol but also a narrowing of the "parity gap" between fuel and E100 prices. In other words, the price of E100 is usually 5 The Brazilian government also gives tax breaks for the purchase of flex-cars. 6 The reason for production of anhydrous ethanol is the blend mandate; the tax exemption for anhydrous ethanol is very low compared to hydrous ethanol. discounted to the price of fuels in terms of the cost per kilometer traveled. The price of E100 at parity (cars get about 30 percent less kilometers per liter of E100 relative to fuel) is denoted by the dotted line in Figure 4 . But historically, E100 prices were at a substantial discount compared to the fuel parity, often reaching levels 25 percent lower than the parity fuel price. This encouraged the adoption of flex cars and infrastructure like E100 dispensing stations. But as the share of flex cars has increased, and hydrous ethanol prices have risen, this discount in the past 2-3 years has disappeared.
The market price of anhydrous ethanol exceeds that of hydrous ethanol because more sugarcane is required to produce a gallon of anhydrous ethanol and there is additional nonsugarcane related production costs associated with anhydrous production. Because sugarcane is used to produce sugar, hydrous ethanol and anhydrous ethanol, then it must be that for a flexible plant -modeled in this paper -the marginal benefits of these three production processes are equal (adjusted for ethanol from molasses, a by-product from sugar production). 
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Brazilian ethanol policies are also important factors affecting the sugar/ethanol markets and can be classified into four categories. First, Brazil has a mandate for anhydrous ethanol mixed with gasoline, requiring 18 to 25 percent of the total fuel mixture to be anhydrous ethanol, depending on supply-demand conditions (it has recently been raised back to 25 percent but was reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent in October 2011). Second, E100 sales enjoy a tax exemption that is greater than what is needed to compensate for the fewer kilometers obtained relative to a liter of the gasoline-anhydrous fuel mixture. The tax on anhydrous ethanol is even lower, although as we show later, consumers only see the E25 price. Third, the government has often in the past, and again recently, held the price of gasoline below world gasoline prices, which fluctuate with world crude oil prices, to avoid adverse effects on inflation. Fourth, the federal government has recently eliminated the fuel tax. We show that in theory each of these policies has an ambiguous impact on ethanol market prices, but empirically we determine that a 
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Source: Using CONAB data 6 higher mandate, gasoline price, and tax exemption 7 for hydrous ethanol results in higher ethanol market (i.e., wholesale) prices, but a lower gasoline tax and a higher tax exemption on anhydrous ethanol results in lower ethanol prices.
The primary objectives of this paper are to (a) develop a general economic model of the trade-off between ethanol and sugar production in Brazil that occurs in a sugarcane processing flex-plant that produces both sugar and ethanol, and where the world prices of each product are determined endogenously; and (b) determine the market effects of Brazil's ethanol policies. To achieve these objectives, we incorporate unique features of Brazil's market and policy into the economic model; especially, we model the two fuel demands and the anhydrous ethanol mandate, the changing parity gap between E100 and fuel prices, ethanol produced from molasses, the by-product of sugar production, and bagasse for electricity production. We also use our model to explain the dramatic change in market conditions from 2010/11 to 2011/12 where ethanol and sugar prices soared, fuel consumption increased, sugarcane production fell and the 7 Intuitively, a higher tax exemption for hydrous ethanol incentivizes its consumption which necessitates more production, hence the wholesale price increase. share of sugarcane processed into ethanol declined ( Figure 5 ). We do not analyze the impacts of U.S. ethanol policy on Brazilian ethanol and sugar markets, but with trade in ethanol, the importance and need for this paper for future research takes on added significance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a brief description of how our approach relates to the literature, we develop an analytical model in Section 3. Section 4
incorporates the shift in the demand curves for fuel and E100. Section 5 presents the comparative static results. Data and calibration used in our empirical model are described in Section 6.
Empirical findings are presented in Section 7; the last section provides key concluding remarks.
Relation to the Literature
There is a fledgling literature on the market effects of Brazilian ethanol policies (e.g., Schmitz et al., 2003; Elobeid and Togkoz, 2008; Balcombe and Rapsomanikis, 2008; Serra et al., 2008; Kliauga et al. 2010; Rajcaniova et al., 2011) . Elobeid and Togkoz (2008) analysis shows that an increase in crude oil prices leads the system towards a new equilibrium with higher ethanol prices. Increases in sugar prices are also found to increase ethanol price levels and volatility (see also Serra 2011).
What Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) and Serra et al. (2011) fail to recognize, however, is that it is gasoline, not oil that links ethanol to sugarcane (and sugar). Moreover, the Brazilian government fixes gasoline prices through Petrobras, a publically traded company, where the government is the biggest shareholder (de Miranda, 2010; Zilberman, 2012) . Under such a regulation, the domestic gasoline prices are delinked from the world oil prices (Figure 4 ), which are determined in a free market.
The earlier strand of econometrics literature (see Zilberman et al., 2013 and Serra, 2012 for surveys) shares two common features. First, many studies analyze periods ending in 2007 or 2008; second, they investigate the long run relationships among the prices. Unlike the econometrics studies, our paper provides a structural model that takes a detailed account of the unique features of the Brazilian sugar-ethanol market. The advantage of our methodology is that it is capable of explaining recent significant (short-term) shocks in the market. Our paper also extends the existing literature (e.g., de Just, 2009, Lapan and Moschini, 2012 ) by incorporating two demand curves for ethanol and by modeling the endogenous decision of flex cars owners to shift between consumption of fuel and hydrous ethanol.
While the time-series models discussed above concentrate on the linkage among commodity prices, structural models focus more on the cost-effective mix of feedstocks to meet the stated targets (e.g., Khanna et al., 2013) and on the relative competitiveness of sugarcane and corn ethanol (e.g., Crago et al., 2010) . Thus, for example, Crago et al. (2010) find that although the production cost of sugarcane ethanol in Brazil is lower than that of corn ethanol in the United
States, once transportation costs for the sugarcane ethanol and the value of corn-related DDGS are included, the relative competitiveness changes. They also find that the relative cost of ethanol in the United States and Brazil is very sensitive to the prevailing exchange rate and prices of feedstocks. This is of particular importance as the Brazilian Real has appreciated about 30 percent in the value relative to the U.S. dollar in the last half decade, (de Gorter et al., 2012) .
The existence of a unique system of flexible plants in Brazil able to adjust their production program in favor of either sugar or ethanol, depending on their relative prices, substantially helps improve the profitability of the Brazilian sugarcane processing sector. Other significantly contributing factors are government policies and market developments.
The Model
Our model considers a competitive industry that processes sugarcane into three products:
sugar, anhydrous ethanol and hydrous ethanol. Sugar and ethanol are competing products because the industry can adjust, although only to a certain extent, the allocation of sugarcane, depending on the relative market price of sugar and ethanol. 8 A by-product of sugarcane processing, regardless of the use of sugarcane, is bagasse, a fibrous matter that is burned in 10 special boilers to cogenerate electricity and steam. 9 Sugar production also yields a by-productmolasses, which is further used to produce anhydrous and hydrous ethanol.
For proper comparison purposes, we express all quantities related to the fuel market (i.e., 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) denotes the revenue from selling the excess supply of electricity at the market prices. The second term represents the internal cost of producing electricity from bagasse. We assume that the electricity prices are exogenous to the processing plant, which makes i Ψ a parameter in the consequent analyses. Notice also that although the observed market price of electricity is higher than the internal price (i.e., P M > P I ), the profit from electricity generation might be negative, depending on the relative size of the excess supply and internal consumption of electricity.
We assume that production of sugar and ethanol exhibits constant returns to scale. A competitive industry will allocate the sugarcane into sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol so that each production process earns zero marginal profits in equilibrium
Equation (2) comes from a zero profit condition for sugar production and takes into account the additional quantity of ethanol that can be produced from molasses. In equation (2), P SC and P S denote market prices of sugarcane and sugar (measured in $/tonne), respectively, and 
Equation (5), obtained by the summation and rearrangement of equations (3) and (4) 
where α denotes an energy-equivalent blend mandate, and t A and t G denote taxes on anhydrous ethanol and gasoline (measured in $/GEEL), respectively. 14 We assume the gasoline price is exogenous to fuel blenders because the Brazilian government regulates gasoline prices through
Petrobras and ethanol production is assumed not to affect world oil prices.
Similarly, the consumer price of hydrous ethanol (E100) is determined by
where, t H denotes the E100 fuel tax and m E100 denotes a constant marketing margin.
The market equilibrium requires that supply of sugarcane, S SC , equal the sum of individual uses of sugarcane: sugar and anhydrous and hydrous ethanol ( )
The first term on the right-hand site of equation (8) 13 be subtracted in order to avoid double counting: the total allocation of sugarcane for hydrous ethanol has already been accounted for in the second term.
The fourth term in equation (8) denotes allocation of sugarcane used for production of anhydrous ethanol. Akin to hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol is used in the domestic transportation sector, quantity αD F , but can also be exported or used in other industries. The quantity for the latter two uses is denoted as I A and is assumed to be determined exogenously.
The last (negative) term again adjusts for the anhydrous ethanol extracted from molasses. 
An intrinsic feature of the model outlined above is its stability in terms of its "elasticity" where changes in policy parameters have small market effects: even if we change all the policy parameters (blend mandate, taxes and gasoline price) and technology parameters (yields of sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol from one tonne of sugarcane) that changed from the 2010/11 to the 2011/12 levels, the impact on the market is modest and in no way reproduces the market changes from 2010/11 to 2011/12 (we will show this empirically later). This means there must have been major exogenous shocks to the Brazilian sugar-ethanol market complex other than the biofuel policy changes. These shocks came in the form of bad weather (shifting the sugarcane supply curve in by about 18.3 percent), income growth that increased the number of cars and kilometers driven (thereby shifting out demand for fuel), and a major shift in export demand for sugar, as evidenced by record world sugar prices. All these shocks would be manifest in shifting the demand/supply curves for fuel, ethanol, sugar and sugarcane. To explain the significant increase in the market prices of the modeled commodities, it is therefore important to quantify the shifts in market demand/supply curves.
The sugarcane supply curve in 2010/11 is depicted in the upper panel of Figure 6a , denoted by S SC with a corresponding price-quantity pair P SC and Q SC , respectively. The price of sugarcane in the 2011/12 marketing year increased to P' SC , while the quantity supplied reduced to Q' SC . As shown in Figure 6a , this implies an inward shift in the sugarcane supply curve, represented by S' SC . The size of the parallel shift is given by distance Q' SC a and is calculated as ( ) ' '
, where the first term represents what the supply of sugarcane would have been if the price had increased to P' SC along the original supply curve.
16
The lower panel of Figure 6a depicts a shift in the aggregate demand for sugar. Both domestic and export demands experienced an outward shift, and we model them separately in the numerical part of our paper. Unlike the upper panel, a decrease in consumption of sugar combined with an increase in its market price is not sufficient to conclude that the demand shifts in. To see this, consider the intersection of the demand curve D S with the vertical dashed line corresponding to C' S . If the price P' S were below this point (but above P S ), the new demand curve would be to the left of the original one. However, the observed data show that the demand for sugar (both domestic and exports) shifted out. The size of the shift is given by ( ) ' '
Shifts in demands for fuel and hydrous ethanol are determined in a similar way ( Figure 6b ).
To see how the assumed elasticities of the demand and supply curves depicted in Figure   6a and 6b affect the size of the shift, we estimate the shifts under three scenarios -low, medium, and high -as shown in Table 1. 17 16 This result holds also for non-linear curves, used in our numerical simulations because the shift is horizontally parallel. 17 The elasticities vary across the literature. For example, the elasticities reported in Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) Export demand for sugar -1.00 -2.00 -4.00 Table 2 presents estimates of the shifts in individual markets in absolute and relative terms (we measure the size of the shift as a percentage of the 2010/11 consumption/production level). We focus on the medium elasticity scenario (our central estimates of elasticities), noting that more elastic market curves are associated with greater shifts (with the exception of the hydrous ethanol demand, where the more elastic demand yields a smaller shift). The first column under each scenario presents the level of a shift. A negative value indicates a shift to the left. In the second column, we report the size of the shift as a percentage of the 2010/11 (baseline) production/consumption. Although all shifts are significant in magnitude, the 22.8 percent increase in the fuel demand and the 33.8 percent increase in the foreign demand (medium scenario) for Brazilian sugar are noticeably high.
The sizable changes (that must have occurred in combination to generate the surge in ethanol and sugar market prices from their 2010/11 levels) reported in Table 2 This can better be seen in Table 3 where we decompose the observed change in Brazilian market prices between the 2010/11 (first column) and 2011/12 (second column) marketing years.
The third column in Table 3 gives estimates of what the market prices would have been, had only the exogenous demand and supply shifts occurred (in combination) and policies been held at their 2010/11 levels. The magnitudes of the exogenous shocks correspond to those pertaining to the medium elasticity scenario in Table 2 .
In the fourth column, we compute the observed price change as the difference between the second and first column. The price changes due to the exogenous shifts only (fifth column)
are given by the difference between the third and first column. Finally, the share of the price change attributable to the shifts in the total observed price change is equal to the ratio of the values in the fifth and fourth columns.
The fact that half of the values in the last column of Table 3 are more than 100 percent indicates that there are considerable market interaction effects not only between Brazilian policies, but also between the policies and exogenous market changes. For example, if biofuel policies had not changed between 2010/11 and 2011/12 and only structural market changes had occurred, we would have observed an even higher rise in the ethanol price.
While Table 2 reports final shifts in market demand and supply curves that reflect all changes in the domestic Brazilian biofuel policy as well as changes in the rest of the world, from a policy analysis point of view, it is important to analyze market effects of a change in a biofuel policy, assuming all other factors, such as income growth or weather, are unchanged. But before we do so, let us model the endogenous shift in demand between E100 and fuel that is generated by a change in the parity gap between E100 and fuel prices when market changes occur.
Modeling the Shift in Demand Curves for E100 versus Fuel
Because a change in the biofuel policy (e.g., an increase in the blend mandate or a reduction in the tax on gasoline), among other things, will affect the relative price of the fuel blend and hydrous ethanol, the composition of fuels consumed will alter accordingly. 18 It is because when the price gap (in energy equivalent) between fuel and E100 narrows, some flex cars owners who previously used hydrous ethanol (e.g., because at then prices it paid them to travel to the nearest E100 pump station), will find it profitable to switch to the blended fuel. 19 In this case, the demand for fuel (measured in GEELs) shifts out by exactly the same amount as the 18 A change in the price of fuel and hydrous ethanol affects the consumers' decision on how many miles to drive. Therefore, in the scenario analysis consumers not only shift between hydrous ethanol and fuel (anhydrous and gasoline) in response to shocks, but also change the total mileage driven. 19 Note that this is only possible for flex cars, as regular fuel (non-flex) vehicles are not able to run on E100. demand for E100 shifts in, keeping the total consumption of fuel and E100 unchanged. This is shown in Figure 7 which uses actual prices for the 2010/11 and 2011/12 marketing years (the latter marked by the prime). The horizontal shift X does not reflect the reality, however, as we assume a change in the biofuel policy is the only driver of the demand shift.
In 2010/11, the price gap between fuel and E100 was 39¢/GEEL (= 2.68 -2.29). Suppose a change in all biofuel policies (i.e., an increase in the mandate, change in fuels taxes, and manipulation of the gasoline price) resulted in a rise in fuel and E100 consumer prices to $2.88/GEEL and $2.80/GEEL, respectively, reducing the price gap to 8¢/GEEL. As the relative price changed in favor of fuel, demand for fuel shifts to D' F , while that for E100 shifts in to D' H .
The magnitude of the shift X depends on the price gap θ: the bigger the gap, the bigger the shift. Let X(θ) be a function characterizing the behavior of flex car owners when the price gap,
, changes. We assume that ( ) X  is at least once continuously differentiable and satisfies ' 0 X dX dθ = > . We also assume that at any point in time the owners of flex cars are sorted according to their propensity to switch between blend fuel and hydrous ethanol, depending on the change in relative price of the two fuels. As the price gap widens, more flex car owners who currently consume blend fuel will find it preferable to switch to E100.
The model defined by equations (1) to (9) can readily be extended to incorporate the endogenous demand shift by specifying the demand curves for fuel blend, D F , and E100, D H , as
The functions ( ) f  and ( ) Figure 8 depicts a family of logistic curves that satisfy the properties (i.e., continuity, differentiability, and monotonicity) imposed on the function X.
Comparative Statics Results
Equations (2) Table 4 . In general, a change in a policy (i.e., mandate, gasoline price, gasoline tax, anhydrous and hydrous ethanol tax) has an ambiguous impact on market prices. The sign of most comparative statics results depends on the sign of the following expression
where the slope of the fuel demand curve, f ', has been expressed by means of the elasticity, η f , of the Marshallian fuel demand. Intuitively, expression (12) represents two simultaneously 20 Note that if the price gap decreases relative to the baseline, then the term ( ) 0 X θ = becomes negative and the fuel demand curve shifts out, while that for E100 shifts in.
occurring effects. First, a change in any policy affects the price of fuel, which in turn results in a change in the quantity of fuel demanded; this is the shift along the fuel demand curve and is represented by the term f '. Second, a change in the fuel price P F -combined with a change in the consumer price for hydrous ethanol -alters the price gap which affects flex cars owners' purchasing decision and so the demand curves for fuel and hydrous ethanol shift in opposite directions. The magnitude of the shift is represented by the term dX/dθ.
The first term on the right side of identity (12) and 2011/12 marketing years, the second term is negative only for α > 0.96; this means the Brazilian ethanol mandate would have to be at least 96 percent for the expression (12) to be negative. We therefore do not consider this possibility further.
The probability of expression (12) being negative increases with a higher elasticity of the fuel demand, higher blend mandate, and smaller sensitivity of flex car owners to the change in 
Given Assumption 1, an exogenous increase in the gasoline price unambiguously results
in an increase in all analyzed prices (Table 4 ). The intuition behind this result is that a higher gasoline price necessitates a higher price of fuel (gasoline plus anhydrous ethanol) charged to the consumers. This gives a cost advantage to hydrous ethanol whose demand shifts out (by the same amount by which the demand for fuel shifts in), thus increasing the market and consumer prices of hydrous ethanol. But as equation (5) shows, market prices of anhydrous and hydrous ethanol are linked on the supply side, giving rise to a higher price of anhydrous ethanol. Owing to the higher competition for the feedstock, the prices of sugarcane and sugar increase. The tax on gasoline has identical (both magnitude and signs) market effects as the gasoline price. The directional effects of a higher tax (or equivalently a lower tax exemption) on anhydrous ethanol on the market prices are also the same as for the gasoline price. The explanation for the signs follows the same logic as above, because a higher tax on anhydrous ethanol increases the consumer price of fuel.
However, the price effects of an increase in the tax (or equivalently a reduction in a tax exemption) on hydrous ethanol exhibit an opposite pattern. The tax drives a wedge between the consumer and market price of hydrous ethanol. As this wedge grows larger, the market price of hydrous ethanol decreases. But because on the supply side it is linked to the anhydrous ethanol price, the latter decreases, too, making the blending of fuel less expensive for the blenders; hence, the decrease in the fuel price. Weaker competition for sugarcane pushes its price and production down. But the reduction in the sugarcane use due to a lower need for ethanol more than offsets the reduction in sugarcane production, thus diverting more feedstock to sugar production. As the supply of sugar increases, its market price falls.
Interestingly, a higher tax has an ambiguous effect on the consumer price of hydrous ethanol. Whether this price will increase or decrease depends on the relative magnitudes of the inward shifts in the demand and supply curves for hydrous ethanol. The demand curve shifts in because of a change in the relative prices in favor of fuel while the supply curve contracts because a lower market price of hydrous ethanol makes this product less profitable to producers, who subsequently divert the feedstock (sugarcane) to sugar production.
Finally, we note that Assumption 1 is not sufficient to draw unequivocal conclusions about the effect of a higher mandate on the market equilibrium (although, as we show later, a higher mandate empirically results in a higher ethanol price). Contrast this with the prediction of the model by de Gorter and Just (2009) where a higher mandate, given a perfectly elastic gasoline supply, unambiguously results in a higher ethanol price. The reason for this difference is the fact, that there are two separate, and mutually competing, demands for ethanol, while the de Gorter and Just's model for the United States has only one demand for corn ethanol.
Data and Calibration
The substantial proportion of hydrous ethanol in total ethanol consumption in Brazil (71 and 60 percent in 2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively) necessitates a consistent measurement of fuel-related quantities and prices in energy-equivalent terms (i.e., according to vehicle kilometers traveled). It is because the hydrous ethanol is typically sold as E100 (i.e., 100 percent ethanol) to owners of 'flex' cars. 21 The empirical evidence suggests that the owners of such cars buy fuel according to the price per kilometer traveled, not per liter bought. To that end, all prices and quantities related to anhydrous and hydrous ethanol as well as fuel (blend of anhydrous ethanol and gasoline) are expressed in gasoline energy-equivalent liters (Appendix 4). The state-of-the-art production plants that process the sugarcane into sugar are able to make use of the sugar's by-product, molasses. Currently, as many as 9.25 liters of ethanol (anhydrous and hydrous combined) can be extracted from the molasses obtained from one tonne of sugarcane. Because the proportion of both ethanol types produced from molasses varies among individual producers, we assume that the ratio of the anhydrous and hydrous ethanol thus produced is the same as the observed ratio of these ethanol types in overall ethanol production.
Thus, for example for 2010/11, the amount of anhydrous ethanol from molasses per tonne of sugarcane is equal to 0.29*9.25 = 2.69 liters, and that of hydrous ethanol is equal to 9.25 -2.69 = 6.56 liters.
Using bagasse for electricity cogeneration significantly improves the economics of all products derived from sugarcane. To illustrate this, the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) reports that one tonne of sugarcane produces 250 kilograms of bagasse worth 85.6 kWh of electricity. 23 The excess supply of electricity not used in the plant, approximately 63 kWh, is currently sold on the grid for about $R100/MWh (price varies). 24 This price needs to be adjusted for the losses of electricity during distribution, however. (It is estimated that the above price would be reduced by as much as 25 percent).
In this paper, we model three biofuel policies: ethanol mandate, tax exemption on anhydrous ethanol (i.e., the difference between the tax levied on gasoline and anhydrous ethanol), and fuel taxes. We calibrate our model to the observed mandate as represented by the actual share of anhydrous ethanol in total fuel consumption, that is, 24.6 and 23.1 percent for 2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively. The system of Brazilian fuel taxes is complex. Appendix 3 presents calculations of the individual taxes on gasoline and the two types of ethanol.
Our (non-linear) demand and supply curves exhibit constant price elasticities. The central estimates of these elasticities come from recent studies analyzing the Brazilian market. In particular, the sugarcane supply elasticity is assumed to be 0.5 (Schmitz et al, 2003) , reflecting the fact that sugarcane is a perennial and its replanting requires significant investments. The Predictably, the demand for hydrous ethanol is more elastic, -0.68 (Menezes et al. 2008) . This is because hydrous ethanol can only be used in the flex cars which can easily change the fuel used according to the relative fuel prices.
We compute the price of fuel as the weighted average of anhydrous and gasoline prices adjusted for the respective taxes. The weights are equal to the shares of ethanol and gasoline in the final fuel blend. The observed fuel price is higher than the computed. We attribute the difference to the marketing margin and treat the margin as a constant. The same applies for the consumer price of hydrous ethanol. The sugarcane production is used for sugar and anhydrous and hydrous ethanol. The production of both anhydrous and hydrous ethanol exceeds their domestic use. The difference is due to trade and industrial use of the ethanol. We assume that this part of ethanol production is exogenous, that is, the biofuel policies do not affect those markets. Brazil exports about two thirds of its sugar production.
An Empirical Illustration

The Shift Function
We use the logistic function of the form
to model the propensity of flex cars owners to switch between consumption of fuel and E100.
Parameters A and D relate to the asymptotes of the logistic function and parameters B and D to its shape. (For a discussion of these parameters and their calibration see Appendix 2). This function is increasing in its argument, meaning that a higher gap between consumer prices of fuel and hydrous ethanol leads to a greater shift-out of the demand for hydrous ethanol (coupled with an opposite shift-in of the demand for fuel).
We set the lower asymptote of function (13) to be the negative of consumption of hydrous ethanol in the baseline. It is because the maximum reduction in the demand for hydrous ethanol occurs when all flex cars using hydrous ethanol in the baseline switch to the fuel blend.
The upper asymptote is more uncertain, however. It depends on how much fuel the flex cars consume in the baseline; this information is, not readily available, however. We therefore perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the upper asymptote, as well as to the curvature of the function X. Parameter values under various scenarios are summarized in Table 5 .
In the benchmark, we assume that the upper asymptote is equal to the negative of the lower asymptote (-10.24 bil. GEELs), meaning that half of flex cars consumes hydrous ethanol and the other half consumes fuel in the baseline. The higher is the gap between consumer prices of fuel and hydrous ethanol in a given point in time, the less sensitive flex cars owners are to changes to this gap. Consider, for instance, the actual price gap of $0.39/GEEL observed in 2010/11. In this case, a small perturbation in the price differential is likely to result in a small change in the proportion of fuel and hydrous ethanol use because flex car owners already "incline" to hydrous ethanol. Contrast this with the price differential of $0.08/GEEL observed in 2011/12. It is reasonable to assume that the inclination to hydrous ethanol is not as strong now as in the previous case, hence a greater sensitivity to a change in the price gap.
To reflect the arguments above, we set the value of the shape parameter B to be 1.2 in the Benchmark and Scenario 1 and 2, but set it much higher (B =5) in Scenario 3. 25 The parameter C is calibrated (Appendix 2) to ensure that given the values of other parameters, the following condition holds: ( )
The logistic curve corresponding to the benchmark specification is depicted in Figure 8 .
In Scenario 1, we set the upper asymptote to one-half of its benchmark level (5.12 bil.
GEELs), while in Scenario 2 we set it to 12.28 bil. GEEL, which is the highest possible value 25 The values for the shape parameter B were arbitrarily chosen to illustrate the point that the sensitivity of flex cars owners to the observed price gap can differ depending on the size of the gap. The relative size of the two values of the shape parameter matters more that their levels. But it should be noted that the choice of this parameters is not completely arbitrary because if the shape parameters is less than unity, the logistic curve becomes decreasing, which runs afoul of our assumption about the monotonicity of this curve. 28 that is consistent with the assumptions on the signs of the other parameters. 26 As shown in Figure   8 , under this scenario, flex cars owners hardly respond to the change in the price gap. The opposite is true for Scenario 3 (where B = 5), where a small deviation from the current price gap makes many flex cars switch to an alternative fuel.
Policy Simulations
We run a battery of simulations to analyze the impacts of individual biofuel policies and market shocks quantitatively. All price changes possess the predicted signs presented in Table 4 .
The first set of simulations (columns denoted by B = 1.2 in Table 6 and 7) assumes the behavior of owners of flex cars is described by the benchmark logistic curve in Figure 26 If the upper asymptote were higher than 12.2 bil. GEELs, the logistic function would be decreasing, thus contradicting our assumption that the bigger the price gap, the bigger the shift. This happens because by requiring that ( ) 0 0 X θ = , we are imposing structure on the logistic function that does not allow for any choice of the upper asymptote. 
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The first policy scenario presented in Table 6 models a recent 28 cent per liter reduction in the gasoline tax (assuming it occurred in the 2010/11 marketing year); ethanol prices decline by 1 cent as a result. The comparative statics results presented in Appendix 1 show that a decrease in the gasoline tax has identical effects -in both sign and magnitude -as a reduction in the gasoline price. This makes our exposition easier because the gasoline price in Brazil is believed to be below its world market counterpart by approximately the same amount as the recent reduction in the gasoline tax. Thus, the results for the first scenario are not only informative of the magnitudes of the market effects of a gasoline tax shock, but also of the effects of exogenously pegging the gasoline price in Brazil below the world prices.
The instantaneous effect of a lower gasoline tax is a reduction in the price of fuel from Figure 9 . This results in an increase in the consumption of fuel by the distance a, 25 percent of which is anhydrous ethanol when the mandate is 25 percent (i.e., with E25). With this decline in the fuel price, the parity gap between fuel and E100 prices declines to P F1 -P E100 and so some E100 consumers switch to fuel consumption. As a result, the hydrous demand curve shifts in by the same amount (distance e) as the fuel demand curve shifts out (distance b); the distances are measured in gasoline energy-equivalent liters. The effect of the government arbitrarily reducing the gasoline price below world prices follows the same set of arguments as the reduction in the gasoline tax while an increase in the tax exemption (equivalent to a decrease in the tax) for hydrous ethanol has the reverse logic of Figure 9 where the demand for hydrous ethanol shifts out first to D' H .
In the second scenario, we analyze what would happen if the 2010/11 mandate decreased by 5 percentage points. 27 Currently, the mandate can range between 18 and 25 percent in Brazil.
Results reported in Table 6 suggest that the sensitivity of flex cars owners (proxied by the curvature of the shifter function) has a minimal effect on the market outcome. For example, while the market price of hydrous ethanol decreases by 3 cents (relative to the baseline) when the mandate is reduced and flex cars owners are less sensitive, it decreases by 2 cents for the same policy change and more sensitive flex car owners.
Notice also that a reduction in the mandate has associated with it an increase in the fuel price by 5 cents. This just illustrates our earlier finding, presented in the section on the 27 Some observers say that the optimal anhydrous ethanol blend mandate is as high as 30 percent. While our baseline value is lower, we expect no qualitative difference between the simulations using our baseline and the 30 percent mandate. Moreover, in the ensuing analysis we show that a change in one policy at a time does not explain much of the observed price changes in Brazil. unambiguously result in a lower fuel price; this might, however, not be the case in an environment with two competing demand for ethanol (as we show in Table 6 ). 28 In sum, the mandate in Brazil operates very differently than in the traditional blend mandate model.
The anhydrous ethanol in Brazil enjoys a significant tax exemption vis-à-vis gasoline (as much as $1.21/GEEL). But fuel consumers benefit from it only to the extent that it lowers the final fuel price which they see (it is because anhydrous ethanol cannot be purchased in its pure form and is always blended with gasoline). If anhydrous ethanol were taxed on parity with gasoline (so that the tax exemption is eliminated), all market prices would increase (third scenario in Table 6 ), although only marginally; for instance, ethanol prices are predicted to rise by 1 cent. In particular, for ethanol producers this result implies that they would be better-off with a higher tax on anhydrous ethanol; or alternatively that they are being implicitly taxed by the existing generous anhydrous tax exemption.
On the other hand, when the tax on hydrous ethanol is raised so as to obtain parity between hydrous ethanol and tax on fuel (where the gasoline and anhydrous ethanol taxes are held at their baseline levels), ethanol prices decline by R$0.07 per liter, making the producers worse-off. This occurs because the tax drives a wedge between the consumer and producer price of hydrous ethanol, pushing the latter down.
The last scenario presented in Table 6 analyzes the effects of the elimination of the blend mandate and all tax exemptions (i.e., the tax on anhydrous ethanol is on parity with that on gasoline while the tax on hydrous ethanol is on parity with the fuel tax, where the fuel tax is given by the weighted average of gasoline and anhydrous taxes). A significantly higher anhydrous price makes the marginal cost to fuel blenders rise, resulting in an increase in the fuel price. A higher consumer price for hydrous ethanol leads to a net decrease in the demand for hydrous ethanol, resulting in lower ethanol production, and thus its lower market price. The sum total effect of eliminating Brazilian ethanol mandate and tax exemptions (gasoline prices and 32 taxes held constant) is to reduce hydrous ethanol prices by 21 percent (= -0.20/0.96 [x100%] ).
Our other research (Drabik, 2011 ) finds a comparable effect of eliminating U.S. ethanol policies for the same time period (a 24 percent reduction in U.S. ethanol prices), although ethanol prices are higher in Brazil and U.S. ethanol consumption is twice that of Brazil.
Unlike the United States, where the mandate always acts as a lower bound on the ethanol price (i.e., it determines the minimum price), the mandate in Brazil may be either a lower or an upper bound. The latter may occur, for example, if sugar demand is low and sugarcane supplies plentiful. In that case, the removal of the mandate would increase the ethanol price. Table 7 presents results for simulations where the Brazilian market experiences a shock in supply of sugarcane; demands for fuel and hydrous ethanol; and demand for sugar. The magnitudes of the shocks correspond to the medium scenario values presented in Table 2 . Both "increase in demand for sugar" and "reduction in supply of sugar" scenarios yield the same qualitative conclusions: the price of sugarcane increases, making production of anhydrous and hydrous ethanol and sugar more expensive; thus the market prices of these commodities rise. A higher market price of anhydrous ethanol increases the marginal cost for fuel blenders; hence the increase in the consumer price of fuel blend. ethanol are uniquely determined. Domestic ethanol demand is depicted in two specified demand curves -one for fuel (a mixture of anhydrous ethanol and gasoline) and the other for hydrous ethanol (E100). We incorporate an endogenous switching model for E100 consumers as they respond to changes in the relative price of E100 and fuel. On the supply side, we incorporate the economics of electricity production from bagasse, ethanol production from molasses (a byproduct of sugar production), and also incorporate the differential cost of producing hydrous and anhydrous ethanol, thereby keeping a specific price link between the two types of ethanol. We do not model Brazil's trade in ethanol -but with U.S. and Brazilian ethanol markets becoming closely linked when the U.S. became a major exporter to Brazil in 2011, the importance of our detailed model of Brazil's sugarcane-ethanol-sugar complex takes on added importance as developments in world sugar markets were directly affecting Chicago futures prices for corn.
Clearly, the next step is to integrate models of the two ethanol sectors.
This paper has several key findings. Unlike biofuel mandates and tax exemptions elsewhere, Brazil's fuel-ethanol-sugar markets and fuel policies are unique in that each policy, in theory, has an ambiguous impact on the market price of ethanol and hence on sugarcane and sugar prices. The Brazilian market is complex with two mutually competing demands for ethanol so any initial change in ethanol price due to a policy change can be offset with shifts in demand for E100 versus fuel. Furthermore, the feedstock is sugarcane which produces two competing products, sugar and ethanol, giving processors more flexibility. But we find that under plausible -11 and 2011-12 are shown in this paper to be relatively small both individually and collectively. We find that observed market changes can only be explained by outward shifts in fuel transportation and sugar export demand curves, and reduced sugarcane supply due to bad weather.
Although the hydrous ethanol tax exemption always increases both anhydrous and hydrous ethanol prices (with or without the mandate), in principle it is very possible that the mandate in Brazil can also act as upper bound on ethanol consumed, (rather than a lower bound as is always the case in the United States), depending on the year and market circumstances. This outcome is more likely, inter alia, when sugar demand is low and sugarcane supplies plentiful. In that case, the removal of the mandate will increase the ethanol price. The number of years in which this has happened in the past (if ever) and the extent to which ethanol prices would have risen with the elimination of the mandate await further research.
Appendix 1. Comparative Statics Results
Totally differentiating the system of equations (2) to (4) and (6) to (11) 
1 1 
Appendix 3: Documentation of Fuel Taxes in Brazil for Gasoline and Ethanol
There are two "fuels" consumed in Brazil: E100 (100 percent hydrous ethanol consumed by flex cars) and "fuel" (a mixture of anhydrous ethanol and petroleum based gasoline). The price of E100 is given by 100 100
where, P E100 denotes the consumer price of hydrous ethanol, P H denotes the wholesale market price of hydrous ethanol, t H denotes the E100 fuel tax, and m E100 denotes a constant marketing margin.
The price of fuel P F is a weighted average of the anhydrous ethanol price P A and gasoline
where α denotes the mandated volume of anhydrous ethanol in total fuel, and t A and t G denote taxes on anhydrous ethanol and gasoline, respectively.
In general, the value of α varies. Because the wholesale gasoline price reported by the ANP -a government agencyincludes the CIDE and PIS/COFINS taxes, we first need to calculate the gasoline price without these two specific taxes. The reported gasoline price with taxes was R$1.54/liter and R$1.53, for 2010/11 and 2011/12, respectively. This means that the implied wholesale market price of gasoline equals R$1.0451 and R$1.099 for each season (before any marketing margin to the retail gas pump is added). tax, in that it is not reported on any receipt or directly on the price of the goods.
Finally, we add all the gasoline taxes to have the total gasoline taxes at R$ 1.2827 and R$1.2305 for these two periods, respectively.
The tax applied on anhydrous ethanol t A is only the PIS/COFINS of R$0.048/liter. The margin for the distributer is R$0.05 for both periods. We add the PIS/COFINS taxes and the margin to the producer price (it give us R$1.04 for 2010/11 and R$1.26 for 2011/12) and from there we calculate the second tax that is the ICMS.
To calculate the ICMS at 12 percent, we add the number we got above to the PIS/COFINS for the distributers (R$0.072) and multiply the sum by 12 percent. The total hydrous tax is R$0.26 for 2010/11 and R$0.30 for 2011/12 (from March to February). In summary, the total hydrous tax is the sum of the PIS/COFINS for the producer and distributer and the ICMS taxes. Schmitz et al. (2003) Elasticity of domestic demand for sugar η 
